Energy Transition

A global biofuels program will potentially lead to intense pressures on land supply and cause widespread transformations in land use. These transformations can alter the Earth climate system by increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from land use changes and by changing the reflective and energy exchange characteristics of land ecosystems. Using an integrated assessment model that links an economic model with climate, terrestrial biogeochemistry, and biogeophysics models, we examined the biogeochemical and biogeophysical effects of possible land use changes from an expanded global second-generation bioenergy program on surface temperatures over the first half of the 21st century. Our integrated assessment model shows that land clearing, especially forest clearing, has two concurrent effects—increased GHG emissions, resulting in surface air warming; and large changes in the land’s reflective and energy exchange characteristics, resulting in surface air warming in the tropics but cooling in temperate and polar regions. Overall, these biogeochemical and biogeophysical effects will only have a small impact on global mean surface temperature. However, the model projects regional patterns of enhanced surface air warming in the Amazon Basin and the eastern part of the Congo Basin. Therefore, global land use strategies that protect tropical forests could dramatically reduce air warming projected in these regions.

© 2013 American Geophysical Union

The United States has adopted fuel economy standards that require increases in the on-road efficiency of new passenger vehicles, with the goal of reducing petroleum use, as well as (more recently) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Understanding the cost and effectiveness of this policy, alone and in combination with economy-wide policies that constrain GHG emissions, is essential to inform coordinated design of future climate and energy policy. In this work we use a computable general equilibrium model, the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, to investigate the effect of combining a fuel economy standard with an economy-wide GHG emissions constraint in the United States. First, a fuel economy standard is shown to be at least five to fourteen times less cost effective than a price instrument (fuel tax) when targeting an identical reduction in cumulative gasoline use. Second, when combined with a cap-and-trade (CAT) policy, the fuel economy standard increases the cost of meeting the GHG emissions constraint by forcing expensive reductions in passenger vehicle gasoline use, displacing more cost-effective abatement opportunities. Third, the impact of adding a fuel economy standard to the CAT policy depends on the availability and cost of abatement opportunities in transport—if advanced biofuels provide a cost-competitive, low carbon alternative to gasoline, the fuel economy standard does not bind and the use of low carbon fuels in passenger vehicles makes a significantly larger contribution to GHG emissions abatement relative to the case when biofuels are not available. This analysis underscores the potentially large costs of a fuel economy standard relative to alternative policies aimed at reducing petroleum use and GHG emissions. It also demonstrates the importance of jointly considering the effects of multiple policies aimed at reducing petroleum use and GHG emissions, and the associated economic costs.

 

We examine the efficiency and distributional impacts of greenhouse gas policies directed toward the electricity sector in a model that links a “top-down” general equilibrium representation of the U.S. economy with a “bottom-up” electricity-sector dispatch and capacity expansion model. Our modeling framework features a high spatial and temporal resolution of electricity supply and demand, including renewable energy resources and generating technologies, while representing CO2 abatement options in non-electric sectors as well as economy-wide interactions. We find that clean and renewable energy standards entail substantial efficiency costs compared to an economy-wide carbon pricing policy such as a cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax, and that these policies are regressive across the income distribution. The geographical distribution of cost is characterized by high burdens for regions that depend on non-qualifying generation fuels, primarily coal. Regions with abundant hydro power and wind resources, and a relatively clean generation mix in the absence of policy, are among the least impacted. An important shortcoming of energy standards vis-à-vis a first-best carbon pricing policy is that no revenue is generated that can be used to alter unintended distributional consequences.

Report Summary
 

Following the failure in 2010 to pass a comprehensive cap-and-trade bill in the United States, analysts and policymakers have called for new or more stringent policies to curb GHG emissions in the electric power sector. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama announced the goal of producing 80 percent of electricity from “clean” energy sources by 2035. The idea of a federal clean energy standard (CES) has been garnering bi-partisan support in Washington, D.C., and at latest count, thirty-six states (plus the District of Columbia) already employ renewable energy standards (RES) or CES programs, most of them mandating that 15 to 25 percent of total electricity production by 2020 has to come from renewable or “clean” sources (DSIRE, 2011). Energy standards in existing and proposed regulation differ with regard to the list of fuel sources included. Unlike a RES program, most CES proposals would credit not only renewable sources, like wind, solar, bio-power, hydropower and geothermal, but would also credit non-emitting non-renewable sources like nuclear energy, and would give partial crediting to certain other technologies, such as gas and coal technologies with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and natural gas combined cycle plants.

This paper examines the efficiency and distributional implications of RES and CES regulation in the U.S. electric power sector employing a numerical general equilibrium model that is uniquely well suited to assessing both economy-wide and electric sector impacts. We investigate the impacts of introducing a federal energy standard, formulated with and without a particular emphasis on incentivizing renewable energy, on economy-wide costs and emissions reductions, relating these impacts to changes in electricity capacity and generation (shifts to low carbon fuels and renewable sources), and changes in general equilibrium products and factor prices.

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has a goal that one billion gallons of renewable jet fuel is consumed by the US aviation industry each year from 2018. We examine the economic and emissions impacts of this goal using renewable fuel produced from a Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids (HEFA) process from renewable oils. Our approach employs an economy-wide model of economic activity and energy systems and a detailed partial equilibrium model of the aviation industry. If soybean oil is used as a feedstock, we find that meeting the aviation biofuel goal in 2020 will require an implicit subsidy from airlines to biofuel producers of $2.69 per gallon of renewable jet fuel. If the aviation goal can be met by fuel from oilseed rotation crops grown on otherwise fallow land, the implicit subsidy is $0.35 per gallon of renewable jet fuel. As commercial aviation biofuel consumption represents less than 2% of total fuel used by this industry, the goal has a small impact on the average price of jet fuel and carbon dioxide emissions. We also find that, under the pathways we examine, the cost per tonne of CO2 abated due to aviation biofuels is between $50 and $400.

© 2013 the authors

The electric power sector, which accounts for approximately 40% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, will be a critical component of any policy the U.S. government pursues to confront climate change. In the context of uncertainty in future policy limiting emissions, society faces the following question: What should the electricity mix we build in the next decade look like? We can continue to focus on conventional generation or invest in low-carbon technologies. There is no obvious answer without explicitly considering the risks created by uncertainty.

This research investigates socially optimal near-term electricity investment decisions under uncertainty in future policy. It employs a novel framework that models decision-making under uncertainty with learning in an economy-wide setting that can measure social welfare impacts. Specifically, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the U.S. is formulated as a two-stage stochastic dynamic program focused on decisions in the electric power sector.

In modeling decision-making under uncertainty, an optimal electricity investment hedging strategy is identified. Given the experimental design, the optimal hedging strategy reduces the expected policy costs by over 50% compared to a strategy derived using the expected value for the uncertain parameter; and by 12-400% compared to strategies developed under a perfect foresight or myopic framework. This research also shows that uncertainty has a cost, beyond the cost of meeting a policy. Results show that uncertainty about the future policy increases the expected cost of policy by over 45%. If political consensus can be reached and the climate science uncertainties resolved, setting clear, long-term policies can minimize expected policy costs.

Ultimately, this work demonstrates that near-term investments in low-carbon technologies should be greater than what would be justified to meet near-term goals alone. Near-term low-carbon investments can lower the expected cost of future policy by developing a less carbon-intensive electricity mix, spreading the burden of emissions reductions over time, and helping to overcome technology expansion rate constraints—all of which provide future flexibility in meeting a policy. The additional near-term cost of low-carbon investments is justified by the future flexibility that such investments create. The value of this flexibility is only explicitly considered in the context of decision-making under uncertainty.

The electric power sector, which accounts for approximately 40% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, will be a critical component of any policy the U.S. government pursues to confront climate change. In the context of uncertainty in future policy limiting emissions and future technology costs, society faces the following question: What should the electricity mix we build in the next decade look like? We can continue to focus on conventional generation or invest in low-carbon technologies. There is no obvious answer without explicitly considering the risks created by uncertainty.

This research investigates socially optimal near-term electricity investment decisions under uncertainty in future policy and technology costs. It employs a novel framework that models decision-making under uncertainty with learning in an economy-wide setting that can measure social welfare impacts. Specifically, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is formulated as a two-stage stochastic dynamic program focused on decisions in the electric power sector.

The new model is applied to investigate a number of factors affecting optimal near-term electricity investments: (1) policy uncertainty, (2) expansion rate limits on low-carbon generation, (3) low-carbon technology cost uncertainty, (4) technological learning (i.e., near-term investment lowers the expected future technology cost), and (5) the inclusion of a safety valve in future policy which allows the emissions cap to be exceeded, but at a cost.

In modeling decision-making under uncertainty, an optimal electricity investment hedging strategy is identified. Given the experimental design, the optimal hedging strategy reduces the expected policy costs by over 50% compared to a strategy derived using the expected value for the uncertain parameter; and by 12-400% compared to strategies developed under a perfect foresight or myopic framework.

This research also shows that uncertainty has a cost, beyond the cost of meeting a policy. In the experimental design used here, uncertainty in the future policy increases the expected cost of policy by over 45%. If political consensus can be reached and the climate science uncertainties resolved, setting clear, long-term policies can minimize expected policy costs.

In addition, this work contributes to the learning-by-doing literature by presenting a stochastic formulation of technological learning in which near-term investments in a technology affect the probability distribution of the future cost of that technology. Results using this formulation demonstrate that learning rates lower than those found in the literature can lead to significant additional near-term investment in low-carbon technology in order to lower the expected future cost of the technology in case a stringent policy is adopted.

Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates that near-term investments in low-carbon technologies should be greater than what would be justified to meet near-term goals alone. Near-term low-carbon investments can lower the expected cost of future policy by developing a less carbon-intensive electricity mix, spreading the burden of emissions reductions over time, helping to overcome technology expansion rate constraints, and reducing the expected future cost of low-carbon technologies—all of which provide future flexibility in meeting a policy. The additional near-term cost of low-carbon investments is justified by the future flexibility that such investments create. The value of this flexibility is only explicitly considered in the context of decision-making under uncertainty.

The residential sector in the U.S. is responsible for about 20% of the country’s primary energy use (EIA, 2011). Studies estimate that efficiency improvements in this sector can reduce household energy consumption by over 25% by 2020 (McKinsey Global Energy and Materials, 2009). In this thesis, given the increasing amount of attention that both policy-makers and industry are giving to residential energy use, I examine the implications of end-use electrification and efficiency improvements in households. In particular, I focus on high efficiency electric technologies for heating and cooling (referred to as HVAC) needs. Advancements in technologies such as heat pumps are beginning to make the economic case for switching from end-uses of gas to end-uses of electricity in the residential sector. I examine the implications of such end-use electrification, ranging from its impact on energy consumption to its contribution to the abatement of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

I use the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, a computable general equilibrium model, to analyze the research question. The EPPA model captures full economy-wide impacts of policy mandates and technology changes. First, I added further detail to household energy consumption in the model. Then, I introduced technology changes corresponding to advanced electric technologies for residential heating and cooling and tested their impact with policies that either support or inhibit their entry into the marketplace.

I find two interesting results from the analysis. First, if policies are enacted to support advanced electric HVAC technologies, they displace end-uses of gas and increase household electricity consumption. Second, household end-use electrification in the U.S. leads to an increase in overall emissions in the economy, given that the overall emissions of any electric appliance depend not only on the end-use efficiency of the appliance but also on the efficiency of generating and distributing electricity. Thus, end use electrification only helps in emissions abatement if the power sector becomes less carbon intensive.

In recent years, China׳s leaders have sought to coordinate official energy intensity reduction targets with new targets for carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity reduction. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) included for the first time a binding target for energy intensity, while a binding target for CO2 intensity was included later in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). Using panel data for a sample of industrial firms in China covering 2005 to 2009, we investigate the drivers of energy intensity reduction (measured in terms of direct primary energy use and electricity use) and associated CO2 intensity reduction. Rising electricity prices were associated with decreases in electricity intensity and increases in primary energy intensity, consistent with a substitution effect. Overall, we find that energy intensity reduction by industrial firms during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan translated into more than proportional CO2 intensity reduction because reducing coal use—in direct industrial use as well as in the power sector—was a dominant abatement strategy. If similar dynamics characterize the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), the national 17 percent CO2 intensity reduction target may not be difficult to meet—and the 16 percent energy intensity reduction target may result in significantly greater CO2 intensity reduction.

© 2015 Elsevier Ltd

Emission controls that provide incentives for maximizing reductions in emissions of ozone precursors on days when ozone concentrations are highest have the potential to be cost-effective ozone management strategies. Conventional prescriptive emissions controls or cap-and-trade programs consider all emissions similarly regardless of when they occur, despite the fact that contributions to ozone formation may vary. In contrast, a time-differentiated approach targets emissions reductions on forecasted high ozone days without imposition of additional costs on lower ozone days. This work examines simulations of such dynamic air quality management strategies for NOx emissions from electric generating units. Results from a model of day-specific NOx pricing applied to the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland (PJM) portion of the northeastern U.S. electrical grid demonstrate (i) that sufficient flexibility in electricity generation is available to allow power production to be switched from high to low NOx emitting facilities, (ii) that the emission price required to induce EGUs to change their strategies for power generation are competitive with other control costs, (iii) that dispatching strategies, which can change the spatial and temporal distribution of emissions, lead to ozone concentration reductions comparable to other control technologies, and (iv) that air quality forecasting is sufficiently accurate to allow EGUs to adapt their power generation strategies.

© 2012 American Chemical Society

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