Regional Analysis

We consider the large range of estimated costs of meeting U.S. climate policy targets. Some of this range is due to different studies using different cost measures, and in principle such differences could be eliminated by more careful comparisons and greater transparency in studies that estimate costs. Still another source of differences is how the proposed policy is represented. Here, again, this source of difference could be reduced by more careful comparison and by better definition of implementation details. Even if these sources of difference could be eliminated, there would remain substantial uncertainties because of the difficulties of projecting economic activity over the long horizon of proposed policies.We show the importance of several of these factors, using a consistent modeling framework.

© 2010 Annual Reviews

This paper discusses the problems of implementing a cap-and-trade system for controlling [SO.sub.2] emissions in China. It describes the evolution of current air emissions policy for [SO.sub.2] emissions and focuses on two critical aspects for establishing a tradable permits system in China: the transition from (nontradable) facility-specific permits to tradable (emission) permits and the integration of tradable permits with the pre-existing pollution levy system. A major theme throughout the paper is that the requirements for establishing an effective tradable permits system do not differ greatly from those for an equally effective tax or command-and-control regime. Although each instrument has distinctive features, the differences among them are mainly ones of form. All require that the same fundamental problems be solved: How to allocate the cost burden of reducing emissions, what specific requirements to place on emitting sources, and how to ensure compliance.

Copyright IAEE

We develop a new model of the U.S., the U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model that is resolved for large states and regions of the U.S. and by income class and apply the model to investigate a $15 per ton CO2 equivalent price on greenhouse gas emissions. Previous estimates of distributional impacts of carbon pricing have been done outside of the model simulation and have been based on energy expenditure patterns of households in different regions and of different income levels. By estimating distributional effects within the economic model, we include the effects of changes in capital returns and wages on distribution and find that the effects are significant and work against the expenditure effects. We find the following:

First, while results based only on energy expenditure have shown carbon pricing to be regressive we find the full distributional effect to be neutral or slightly progressive. This demonstrates the importance of tracing through all economic impacts and not just focusing on spending side impacts.

Second, the ultimate impact of such a policy on households depends on how allowances, or the revenue raised from auctioning them, is used. Free distribution to firms would be highly regressive, benefiting higher income households and forcing lower income households to bear the full cost of the policy and what amounts to a transfer of wealth to higher income households. Lump sum distribution through equal-sized household rebates would make lower income households absolutely better off while shifting the costs to higher income households. Schemes that would cut taxes are generally slightly regressive but improve somewhat the overall efficiency of the program.

Third, proposed legislation would distribute allowances to local distribution companies (electricity and natural gas distributors) and public utility commissions would then determine how the value of those allowances was used. A significant risk in such a plan is that distribution to households might be perceived as lowering utility rates That reduced the efficiency of the policy we examined by 40 percent.

Finally, the states on the coasts bear little cost or can benefit because of the distribution of allowance revenue while mid-America and southern states bear the highest costs. This regional pattern reflects energy consumption and energy production difference among states. Use of allowance revenue to cut taxes generally exacerbates these regional differences because coastal states are also generally higher income states, and those with higher incomes benefit more from tax cuts.

We analyze the distributional and efficiency impacts of different allowance allocation schemes for a national cap and trade system using the USREP model, a new recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. The USREP model tracks nine different income groups and twelve different geographic regions within the United States. Recently proposed legislation include the Waxman-Markey House bill, the similar Kerry-Boxer bill in the Senate that has been replaced by a Kerry-Lieberman draft bill, and the Cantwell-Collins Senate bill that takes a different approach to revenue allocation. We consider allocation schemes motivated by these recent proposals applied to a comprehensive national cap and trade system that limits cumulative greenhouse gas emissions over the control period to 203 billion metric tons. The policy target approximates national goals identified in pending legislation. We find that the allocation schemes in all proposals are progressive over the lower half of the income distribution and proportional in the upper half of the income distribution. Scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins allocation proposal are less progressive in early years and have lower welfare costs due to smaller redistribution to low income households and consequently lower income-induced increases in energy demand and less savings and investment. Scenarios based on the three other allocation schemes tend to overcompensate some adversely affected income groups and regions in early years but this dissipates over time as the allowance allocation effect becomes weaker. Finally we find that carbon pricing by itself (ignoring the return of carbon revenues through allowance allocations) is proportional to modestly progressive. This striking result follows from the dominance of the sources over uses side impacts of the policy and stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has focused only on the uses side. The main reason is that lower income households derive a large fraction of income from government transfers and, reflecting the reality that these are generally indexed to inflation, we hold the transfers constant in real terms. As a result this source of income is unaffected by carbon pricing, while wage and capital income is affected.

We analyze the distributional and efficiency impacts of different allowance allocation schemes motivated by recently proposed U.S. climate legislation for a national cap and trade system using a new dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. The USREP model tracks nine different income groups and twelve different geographic regions within the U.S. We find that the allocation schemes in all proposals are progressive over the lower half of the income distribution and proportional in the upper half of the income distribution. Scenarios based on the Cantwell-Collins allocation proposal are less progressive in early years and have lower welfare costs due to smaller redistribution to low income households and, consequently, lower incomeinduced increases in energy demand and less savings and investment. Scenarios based on the three other allocation schemes tend to overcompensate some adversely affected income groups and regions in early years, but this dissipates over time as the allowance allocation effect becomes weaker. Finally, we find that carbon pricing by itself (ignoring the return of carbon revenues through allowance allocations) is proportional to modestly progressive. This striking result follows from the dominance of the sources over uses side impacts of the policy and stands in sharp contrast to previous work that has focused only on the uses side. The main reason is that lower income households derive a large fraction of income from government transfers, and we hold the transfers constant in real terms, reflecting the fact that transfers are generally indexed to inflation. As a result, this source of income is unaffected by carbon pricing while wage and capital income is affected.

© 2010 The Berkeley Electronic Press

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