Climate Policy

This paper summarizes recent empirical research on compliance costs and strategies and on permit market performance under the U.S. acid rain program, the first large-scale, long-term program to use tradeable emissions permits to control pollution. An efficient market for emissions permits developed in a few years, and this program more than achieved its early goals on time, and it cost less than had been projected. Because of expectation errors, however, investment was excessive, and permit prices substantially understate abatement costs. The tradeable permits approach has worked well, but it is not a miracle cure for environmental problems. Coauthors are Paul L. Joskow, A. Denny Ellerman, Juan Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.

Copyright American Economic Association 

In this paper, we present a method to quantify the effectiveness of carbon mitigation options taking into account the "permanence" of the emissions reduction. While the issue of permanence is most commonly associated with a "leaky" carbon sequestration reservoir, we argue that this is an issue that applies to just about all carbon mitigation options. The appropriate formulation of this problem is to ask 'what is the value of temporary storage?' Valuing temporary storage can be represented as a familiar economic problem, with explicitly stated assumptions about carbon prices and the discount rate. To illustrate the methodology, we calculate the sequestration effectiveness for injecting CO2 at various depths in the ocean. Analysis is performed for three limiting carbon price assumptions: constant carbon prices (assumes constant marginal damages), carbon prices rise at the discount rate (assumes efficient allocation of a cumulative emissions cap without a backstop technology), and carbon prices first rise at the discount rate but become constant after a given time (assumes introduction of a backstop technology). Our results show that the value of relatively deep ocean carbon sequestration can be nearly equivalent to permanent sequestration if marginal damages (i.e., carbon prices) remain constant or if there is a backstop technology that caps the abatement cost in the not too distant future. On the other hand, if climate damages are such as to require a fixed cumulative emissions limit and there is no backstop, then a storage option with even very slow leakage has limited value relative to a permanent storage option.

Marginal abatement curves (MACs) are often used heuristically to demonstrate the advantages of emissions trading. In this paper, the authors derive MACs from EPPA, the MIT Joint Program's computable general equilibrium model of global economic activity, energy use and CO2 emissions, to analyze the benefits of emissions trading in achieving the emission reduction targets implied by the Kyoto Protocol. The magnitude and distribution of the gains from emissions trading are examined for both an Annex B market and for full global trading, as well as the effects of import limitations, non-competitive behavior, and less than fully efficient supply. In general, trading benefits all parties at least some, and from a global standpoint, the gains from trading are greater, the wider and less constrained is the market. The distribution of the gains from trading is, however, highly skewed in favor of those who would face the highest costs in the absence of emissions trading.

On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced a Clear Skies Initiative that
proposes, among other things, to reduce the existing cap on total SO2 emissions
from approximately 8.9 million tons under the existing provisions of Title IV of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to 4.5 million tons starting in 2010 and to 3.0
million tons starting in 2018. The proposed reductions in the SO2 cap are similar
to that facing the 263 generating units that were mandated to be subject to
Phase I under Title IV and which occasioned a significant amount of early overcontrol
and consequent banking of a llowances for later use. If enacted, there is
every reason to believe that electric utilities would similarly engage in banking
behavior prior to the reductions in the cap. Accordingly, any evaluation of the
costs and economic effects of this proposal must make some assumption about
banking.

The first section of this paper briefly describes banking and summarizes the
grounds for concluding that banking behavior under Title IV has been largely
rational, and therefore nearly optimal. This conclusion is the subject of another
paper now being written by Juan Pablo Montero and myself and the most that
can be done here is to adumbrate the argument. In the following section, the
simple model that closely tracks observed banking behavior under Title IV is
used to simulate the response to the proposed further reductions in the SO2 cap.
The results reported concern marginal and total costs of abatement, emission
levels, allowance prices, and the value of the existing endowment of allowances.
This section is then following by one presenting a sensitivity analysis in which the
three principal uncertainties—the timing and levels of the reduced caps, the
discount rate, and the predicted rate of growth in counterfactual emissions—are
varied; and a final section concludes.

The U.S. Congress is considering a set of bills designed to limit the nation's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Several of these proposals call for a cap-and-trade system; others propose an emissions tax. This paper complements the analysis by Paltsev et al. (2007) of cap-and-trade bills and applies the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model to carry out an analysis of the tax proposals. Several lessons emerge from this analysis. First, a low starting tax rate combined with a low rate of growth in the tax rate will not reduce emissions significantly. Second, the costs of GHG reductions are reduced with the inclusion of non-CO2 gases in the carbon tax scheme. The costs of the Larson plan, for example, fall by 20% with inclusion of the other GHGs. Third, welfare costs of the policies can be affected by the rate of growth of the tax, even after controlling for cumulative emissions. Fourth, a carbon tax — like any form of carbon pricing — is regressive. However, general equilibrium considerations suggest that the short-run measured regressivity may be overstated. A portion of the carbon tax is passed back to workers, owners of equity, and resource owners. To the extent that relatively wealthy resource and equity owners bear some fraction of the tax burden, the regressivity will be reduced. Additionally, the regressivity can be offset with a carefully designed rebate of some or all of the revenue. Finally, the carbon tax bills that have been proposed or submitted are for the most part comparable to many of the carbon cap-and-trade proposals that have been suggested. Thus the choice between a carbon tax and cap-and-trade system can be made on the basis of considerations other than their effectiveness at reducing emissions over some control period. Either approach (or some hybrid of the two approaches) can be equally effective at reducing GHG emissions in the United States.

Drawing upon a variety of different criteria, many nations have introduced proposals to differentiate the reductions in carbon emissions that would be required of industrialized nations in the short to medium term. This paper considers the relationship of these proposals to their underlying conceptions of equity, and to the self-interest of the nations proposing them. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Assessment (EPPA) model is used to analyze the welfare implications of several prominent proposals, considering both cases where nations must carry out all emissions reductions domestically, and situations where trading in emissions permits is allowed. The consequences of applying two prominent differentiation measures to a global regime using a zero-based allocation of emissions rights is also explored. One conclusion is that a trading regime can yield important benefits in reducing potential conflict within developed nations, and help avoid complicated and divisive negotiations over burden-sharing formulas.

About the book: Over the last decade, market-based incentives have become the regulatory tool of choice when trying to solve difficult environmental problems. Evidence of their dominance can be seen in recent proposals for addressing global warming (through an emissions trading scheme in the Kyoto Protocol) and for amending the Clean Air Act (to add a new emissions trading systems for smog precursors and mercury--the Bush administration's "Clear Skies" program). They are widely viewed as more efficient than traditional command and control regulation. This collection of essays takes a critical look at this question, and evaluates whether the promises of market-based regulation have been fulfilled. Contributors put forth the ideas that few regulatory instruments are actually purely market-based, or purely prescriptive, and that both approaches can be systematically undermined by insufficiently careful design and by failures of monitoring and enforcement. All in all, the essays recommend future research that no longer pits one kind of approach against the other, but instead examines their interaction and compatibility.

To what extent do the welfare costs associated with the implementation of the Burden Sharing Agreement in the European Union depend on sectoral allocation of emissions rights? What are the prospects for strategic climate policy to favor domestic production? This paper attempts to answer those questions using a CGE model featuring a detailed representation of the European economies. First, numerical simulations show that equalizing marginal abatement costs across domestic sectors greatly reduces the burden of the emissions constraint but also that other allocations may be preferable for some countries because of pre-existing tax distortions. Second, we show that the effect of a single country's attempt to undertake a strategic policy to limit impacts on its domestic energy-intensive industries has mixed effects. Exempting energy-intensive industries from the reduction program is a costly solution to maintain the international competitiveness of these industries; a tax-cum-subsidy approach is shown to be better than exemption policy to sustain exports. The welfare impact either policy — exemption or subsidy — on other European countries is likely to be small because of general equilibrium effects. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers

In 2007 the US Congress began considering a set of bills to implement a cap-and-trade system to limit the nation’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The MIT Integrated Global System Model (IGSM) — and its economic component, the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model — were used to assess these proposals. In the absence of policy, the EPPA model projects a doubling of US greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Global emissions, driven by growth in developing countries, are projected to increase even more. Unrestrained, these emissions would lead to an increase in global CO2 concentration from a current level of 380 ppmv to about 550 ppmv by 2050 and to near 900 ppmv by 2100, resulting in a year 2100 global temperature 3.5–4.5°C above the current level. The more ambitious of the Congressional proposals could limit this increase to around 2°C, but only if other nations, including developing countries, also strongly controlled greenhouse gas emissions. With these more aggressive reductions, the economic cost measured in terms of changes in total welfare in the United States could range from 1.5% to almost 2% by the 2040–2050 period, with 2015 CO 2-equivalent prices between $30 and $55, rising to between $120 and $210 by 2050. This level of cost would not seriously affect US GDP growth but would imply large-scale changes in its energy system.

© 2008 Earthscan

Supersedes Report 146.

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