Written by Valerie Karplus, an Assistant Professor in the Global Economics and Management Group at the MIT Sloan School of Management and the Director of the MIT-Tsinghua China Energy and Climate Project, this paper examines China’s current approach to tackling air pollution and carbon mitigation nationally and argues that more incentives are needed if China hopes to meet its “peak carbon” goal by 2030.

The urgency with which Beijing is tackling air pollution is certainly positive, and such actions will lead to concomitant benefits in curtailing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, to a certain extent. But Karplus argues that it would be a mistake to view the current initiatives on air pollution, which are primarily aimed at scrubbing coal-related pollutants or reducing coal use, as perfectly aligned with carbon reduction.

This is not the case, according to Karplus. Air pollution reduction is only partly aligned with CO₂ reduction, and vice versa. In addition to air pollution efforts, effective co-control requires a more significant step: a meaningful price on carbon. This is especially so if Beijing is to realize its 2030 pledge. Put another way, air pollution control efforts, while essential, will only take China part of the way toward its stated carbon reduction goals.

One major reason is because while low-cost solutions for air pollution and carbon reduction can overlap, the reality is that co-benefits run out after low-cost opportunities to reduce or displace the fuels responsible for both carbon and air pollution emissions—mostly coal in China’s case—are exhausted. In other words, co-benefits diminish over time as greater reductions are needed, according to Karplus.

This paper originally appeared as part of the Paulson Papers on Energy and Environment series.

© 2015 The Paulson Institute

China has embarked on an ambitious pathway for establishing a national carbon market in the next 5–10 years. In this study, we analyze the distributional aspects of a Chinese emissions-trading scheme from ethical, economic, and stated-preference perspectives. We focus on the role of emissions permit allocation and first show how specific equity principles can be incorporated into the design of potential allocation schemes. We then assess the economic and distributional impacts of those allocation schemes using a computable general equilibrium model with regional detail for the Chinese economy. Finally, we conduct a survey among Chinese climate-policy experts on the basis of the simulated model impacts. The survey participants indicate a relative preference for allocation schemes that put less emissions-reduction burden on the western provinces, a medium burden on the central provinces, and a high burden on the eastern provinces. Most participants show strong support for allocating emissions permits based on consumption-based emissions responsibilities.

© 2015 Springer

High frequency, in situ observations from 11 globally distributed sites for the period 1994–2014 and archived air measurements dating from 1978 onward have been used to determine the global growth rate of 1,1-difluoroethane (HFC-152a, CH₃CHF₂). These observations have been combined with a range of atmospheric transport models to derive global emission estimates in a top-down approach. HFC-152a is a greenhouse gas with a short atmospheric lifetime of about 1.5 years. Since it does not contain chlorine or bromine, HFC-152a makes no direct contribution to the destruction of stratospheric ozone and is therefore used as a substitute for the ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). The concentration of HFC-152a has grown substantially since the first direct measurements in 1994, reaching a maximum annual global growth rate of 0.84"¯±"¯0.05"¯ppt"¯yr⁻¹ in 2006, implying a substantial increase in emissions up to 2006. However, since 2007, the annual rate of growth has slowed to 0.38"¯±"¯0.04"¯ppt"¯yr⁻¹ in 2010 with a further decline to an annual average rate of growth in 2013–2014 of −0.06"¯±"¯0.05"¯ppt"¯yr⁻¹. The annual average Northern Hemisphere (NH) mole fraction in 1994 was 1.2"¯ppt rising to an annual average mole fraction of 10.1"¯ppt in 2014. Average annual mole fractions in the Southern Hemisphere (SH) in 1998 and 2014 were 0.84 and 4.5"¯ppt, respectively. We estimate global emissions of HFC-152a have risen from 7.3"¯±"¯5.6"¯Gg"¯yr⁻¹ in 1994 to a maximum of 54.4"¯±"¯17.1"¯Gg"¯yr⁻¹ in 2011, declining to 52.5"¯±"¯20.1"¯Gg"¯yr⁻¹ in 2014 or 7.2"¯±"¯2.8"¯Tg-CO₂"¯eq"¯yr⁻¹. Analysis of mole fraction enhancements above regional background atmospheric levels suggests substantial emissions from North America, Asia, and Europe. Global HFC emissions (so called “bottom up” emissions) reported by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are based on cumulative national emission data reported to the UNFCCC, which in turn are based on national consumption data. There appears to be a significant underestimate ( > "¯20"¯Gg) of “bottom-up” reported emissions of HFC-152a, possibly arising from largely underestimated USA emissions and undeclared Asian emissions.

© 2016 the authors

Many hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) that are widely used as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances (now regulated under the Montreal Protocol) are very potent greenhouse gases (GHGs). China’s past and future HFC emissions are of great interest because China has emerged as a major producer and consumer of HFCs. Here, we present for the first time a comprehensive inventory estimate of China’s HFC emissions during 2005–2013. Results show a rapid increase in HFC production, consumption, and emissions in China during the period and that the emissions of HFC with a relatively high global warming potential (GWP) grew faster than those with a relatively low GWP. The proportions of China’s historical HFC CO₂-equivalent emissions to China’s CO₂ emissions or global HFC CO₂-equivalent emissions increased rapidly during 2005–2013. Using the “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario, in which HFCs are used to replace a significant fraction of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) in China (to date, there are no regulations on HFC uses in China), emissions of HFCs are projected to be significant components of China’s and global future GHG emissions. However, potentials do exist for minimizing China’s HFC emissions (for example, if regulations on HFC uses are established in China). Our findings on China’s historical and projected HFC emission trajectories could also apply to other developing countries, with important implications for mitigating global GHG emissions.