Shell Scenarios

The Energy Security Scenarios

Entering a world of competitive transition

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Scenarios - What are they?

- Scenarios explore how the world could possibly evolve under different sets of assumptions.
  - Informed by data.
  - Constructed using models.
- Scenarios contain insights from leading experts in the relevant fields.
- Scenarios consider different versions of possible futures. Some may seem unlikely or even surprising.
- The value to Shell is to help senior management think about the long-term challenges Shell could face.
- Scenarios are not expressions of Shell’s strategy, they are not Shell’s business plan and they do not necessarily reflect the thinking or behaviour of the business.
- Shell also publishes some of its scenario thinking to help governments, academia and business to think about the long-term challenges that they, and the world at large, could face.
- Scenarios are possible worlds built from incomplete and uncertain information.
- Scenarios are intended as an aid to making better decisions. They stretch minds and broaden horizons.
A security mindset is rapidly emerging throughout the world...

...but a deeper exploration reveals the foundation for an accelerated energy transition
In a troubled world, four key drivers of change

Rising energy costs, food prices, inflation

Global surface temperature continues to rise

Accelerated technological change

Least developed economies need energy
Four emerging energy transition archetypes, each with a differing pace of decarbonisation:

- **Innovation Wins**
  - (new solutions with rapid commercialisation)
  - (Emergent)

- **Surfers**
  - (riding the waves of opportunity)
  - (Rising)

- **Green Dream**
  - (rapid shift from oil and gas and reduced energy demand)
  - (Rising)

- **Great Wall of Change**
  - (a China-led low-carbon infrastructure push)
  - (Rising)

**KEY**
- **MORE ABLE TO ENDURE**
- **LESS ABLE TO ENDURE**
- **REACTION TO PRICE VOLATILITY**
- **WITHSTANDING SUPPLY DISRUPTION**
Two scenarios emerge, Sky 2050 and Archipelagos

As the security mindset takes hold and national interests take precedence a tension emerges between national climate pledges and what countries must do to address immediate energy concerns.

We are collectively entering a world of competitive transition.
The security mindset becomes entrenched worldwide. Sentiment shifts away from managing emissions and towards energy security.

- **Green Dream** – the energy shock speeds up transition. Supply fear is heightened.
- **Innovation Wins** – disruption in the old energy system offers new opportunities.
- **Great Wall of Change** – de-globalization supports internal energy transformation and strengthening.
- **Surfers** – shifting alliances offer immediate advantages and opportunities are taken.

**Archipelagos**

**Security through self interest**
Sky 2050
Security through mutual interest

Long-term climate security is the primary anchor, with specific targets to reach net zero by 2050 and limit temperature rise to 1.5°C in 2100.

- **Green Dream** – applies global carbon pricing via border adjustment mechanisms.
- **Innovation Wins** – accelerated technology development through government funding.
- **Great Wall of Change** – enviable market position drives faster change in other regions.
- **Surfers** – intense global pressure to end deforestation, but finance becomes more available.
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Primary energy in **Sky 2050** and **Archipelagos**

**The energy transition accelerates**

- It becomes increasingly competitive as nations seek security of supply.
- **Sky 2050** takes a wider view of security, with positive reinforcement leading to rapid change.
- Fossil fuels lose market share within the primary energy mix.
- Multiple energy transition tipping points emerge worldwide throughout the 2020s.
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In any scenario, the long-term electrification trend accelerates

The final energy system trends rapidly towards electricity

- A century long trend shifts gear in the 2020s.
- Electrification of transport leads the way:
  - Passenger vehicles.
  - Light road freight.
- Residential energy use trends towards full electrification, even for heating.
- Industrial energy use shifts more slowly, but still electrifies over time.

Electricity as a fraction of total final energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fraction of final energy (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- >10% points per decade increase
- >5% points per decade increase
- Around 2% points per decade increase for a century


- History
- Archipelagos
- Sky 2050
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A renewable energy tipping point

Electricity generation is driven by the availability of renewables

- Solar PV capacity of over 200 GW is being added on an annual basis, delivering some 250-300 Terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity.
- In Archipelagos this grows to around 400 TWh in the early 2030s, greater than the early 2020s additions from coal and natural gas combined.
- Both coal and natural gas stop growing as sources of electricity into the 2030s, then decline sets in.
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Molecular fuels remain important in some applications

Biofuels, synthetic fuels and hydrogen all have increasing roles

- Liquid biofuels increase, but 1st generation ethanol peaks before 2035. 2nd generation fuels grow from 2025.
- Hydrogen emerges in the 2020s and is quick to ramp up in Sky 2050.
- In 2050, oil and gas derived final energy fuels still total 107 EJ in Sky 2050 (vs. 230 EJ in 2019), over four times that of low carbon fuels.
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Sinks play a critical role in Sky 2050

In Sky 2050 570 Gt of CO₂ is stored geologically and land carbon is bolstered by 340 Gt (in CO₂ terms)

- Geological storage is the long-term mechanism for balancing remaining fossil-fuel use.
- Land carbon management is essential for a stable climate:
  - Stopping deforestation then restoration. An area the size of Mexico requires reforestation.
  - Managing soil carbon – most arable land comes under some form of carbon management through farming.
  - Sustainable business models need to emerge to support carbon farming.

![Graph showing land use changes and the development of sinks](image-url)
Net zero emissions (NZE) is an almost inevitable outcome

- **Sky 2050** reaches NZE in 2050 (by design), combining energy and land use changes.
- By 2100, warming is less than 1.5°C in **Sky 2050**.
- **Archipelagos** reaches NZE early in the 22nd century but warming exceeds 2°C.
- Scenarios above 2.5°C no longer appear plausible given the anticipated pace of the energy transition.
Sky 2050 is consistent with the Paris Agreement

- **Sky 2050** is an overshoot 1.5°C scenario, peaking at 1.67°C in 2049, falling to 1.24°C by 2100.
- It meets the IPCC AR6 definition for a 1.5°C scenario with high overshoot.
- According to MIT’s model, in 2023, the global mean surface temperature is 1.27°C above 1850-1900.
- Both scenarios pass 1.5°C by 2034.
- In **Sky 2050**, the temperature in 2100 is almost the same as the world experiences in 2023.
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The world in 2050 and 2100
Sources and sinks of anthropogenic carbon (as CO₂) in 2019
Positive emissions of 41 Gt CO₂ per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Flow (Gt/year)</th>
<th>Stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal, oil, gas extraction</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>+39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone for cement</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use and agriculture</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS + DACCS</td>
<td>-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bioenergy + CCS (BECCS)</td>
<td>-0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products in society</td>
<td>- 2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Atmosphere build of 41 Gt CO₂ in 2019

- 3.8 Gt Land use change
- 1.8 Gt Net process CO₂ (e.g. cement)
- 35.5 Gt Net fossil
- 3.3 Gt Bioenergy use
- 2.6 Gt Non-energy use (e.g. plastics)
Sources and sinks of anthropogenic carbon (as CO₂) in Sky 2050

Net zero emissions in 2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources/Sinks</th>
<th>Flow (Gt/year)</th>
<th>Stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal, oil, gas extraction</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone for cement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use and agriculture</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS + DACCS</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bioenergy + CCS (BECCS)</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products in society</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net process CO₂ (e.g. cement) 1.3 Gt
Synthetic fuel use 0.1 Gt
Direct air capture 0.5 Gt
Net fossil 7.1 Gt
Non-energy use (e.g. plastics) 2 Gt
Photo-synthesis 7.7 Gt
Bioenergy use 5.7 Gt

Land use change 6 Gt
CCS 0.7 Gt
CCS + DACCS 5.5 Gt
BECCS 1.5 Gt

Net fossil 15 Gt extracted (in CO₂ terms)
Sources and sinks of anthropogenic carbon (as CO₂) in Sky 2050

Net negative emissions of 14.8 Gt CO₂ per year in 2100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources and Sinks</th>
<th>Flow (Gt/year)</th>
<th>Stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal, oil, gas extraction</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limestone for cement</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land use and agriculture</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS + DACCS</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bioenergy + CCS (BECCS)</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products in society</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atmosphere drawdown of 14.8 Gt CO₂</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Sources**
  - Coal, oil, gas extraction: 2.9 Gt/year
  - Limestone for cement: 1.3 Gt/year
  - Land use and agriculture: -3.2 Gt/year
  - CCS + DACCS: -7.7 Gt/year
  - Bioenergy + CCS (BECCS): -3.5 Gt/year
  - Products in society: -4.6 Gt/year

- **Sinks**
  - Atmosphere drawdown of 14.8 Gt CO₂ in 2100
Concluding remarks

1. Countries with similar energy vulnerabilities behave in similar ways.

2. **Rising Surfers** and the energy pathway they take are key to limiting warming.

3. The world switches to electricity at an accelerated pace, but hydrogen and bioenergy have important roles to play.

4. Fossil fuels inevitably lose market share.

5. Emissions do not initially fall quickly, with a 12% reduction in CO₂ emissions by 2030 achieved in **Sky 2050** (vs. 2010).

6. Overshoot of 1.5°C appears almost inevitable, but recovery is possible in the second half of the century. The world must remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere at large scale.

7. There is a significant emissions gap between the scenarios, but society is nevertheless heading towards net-zero emissions.

8. The timing of net-zero emissions is dictated by policy efforts and the business, consumer relationship.